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Tensions in the South China Sea have risen in recent years for reasons related to 
conflicting territorial claims and rivalry, competition for access to fish stocks as 
well as oil and gas fields, and in China’s case, emerging strategic interests. Because 
international law largely excludes it from an area it regards as historically Chinese, 
China has recently become more assertive in pushing its claim, resorting to 
power projection, particularly against smaller claimants, such as Vietnam and the 
Philippines. China’s actions have drawn in external powers, including the United 
States, Japan, and India, a development that exacerbates the problem. The danger 
is not that the United States and China may come into a direct conflict, but that 
through error or miscalculation a clash may escalate into a conflict involving external 
powers. Proposals to prevent conflict and stabilize the area include an agreement 
to avoid incidents at sea. Also a UN-sponsored conference on the South China Sea 
could contribute to a long-term resolution of the issue by dealing with competing 
claims in a semi-enclosed sea and other outstanding issues.
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Introduction
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, which is defined in Article 122 of the 
United Nations Convention on the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as 
“a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more states and connected to another 
sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.” It 
includes the 15 islands of the Paracel archipelago, 45 islands and numerous reefs 
and rocks of the Spratly archipelago, the Macclesfield Bank, and the three islands 
of the Pratas group. The dispute over the islands and sea territory involves China 
and five Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries: Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. China and Vietnam have 
extensive claims over the area that is largely undefined, while the Philippines, 
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Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia claim contiguous sea zones. The dispute involves 
complicated issues relating to UNCLOS, which does not offer clear guidelines in 
situations where claims to sea territory, islands, and Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) overlap. This article examines the reasons for China’s recent assertiveness 
in the area and identifies the impact upon the other claimants and upon external 
players. As a result of Chinese assertiveness, tensions have risen in the South 
China Sea, which heightens the risk of error or miscalculation and conflict. The 
article proposes ways to stabilize the situation in order to avoid unintended 
clashes that could lead to escalation, and examines ways in which the dispute 
might be resolved. 
Factors in the dispute include fishing rights over stocks of migratory fish 
including albacore, skipjack, and yellowfin (Rosenberg 2011). Both Chinese and 
Vietnamese fishermen have long regarded parts of the Sea, particularly around the 
Paracel Islands, as traditional fishing zones. The United Nations (UN) has warned 
that fish stocks in the sea are in jeopardy as populations increase exacerbating 
competition to exploit the fisheries of the area (UN News Centre 2011). A second 
factor includes competing claims to oil and gas reserves as global demand for 
energy rises and major consumers, especially China, seek new sources to fuel 
their expanding economies. In 2011, China’s oil imports accounted for about 
54% of its total demand. To reduce its dependence on imported oil China has 
increased imports of natural gas and expanded the domestic production of coal, 
exacerbating the problem of atmospheric pollution in Chinese cities (International 
Energy Agency 2012). China has shown growing interest in the oil and natural 
gas resources of the South China Sea and its estimates of the oil reserves there 
have been much higher than those of multinational oil companies. Some Chinese 
estimates claim that the area holds some 80% of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves. 
However, the United States Department of Energy doubts this, declaring that 
“there is little evidence outside of Chinese claims to support the view that the 
region contains substantial oil resources.” The Department adds that natural gas 
may be more important than oil in the South China Sea as the U.S. Geological 
Survey estimates that about “60 to 70% of the region’s hydrocarbon resources are 
natural gas” (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2008). Again, Chinese estimates of 
the area’s natural gas reserves are considerably higher than others. 
For China, there is also the strategic significance of the South China Sea 
since it is becoming a focal point for naval rivalry with the United States. From 
the Chinese perspective the U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific prevents 
the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, and for this reason it becomes 
imperative for China to develop the ability to prevent the U.S. navy from coming 
to Taiwan’s assistance if there were to be a conflict. To this end, China has been 
developing a second strike submarine-based nuclear capability which would deter 
the United States from risking conventional conflict with China over Taiwan or 
any other issue. China has deployed a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying 
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nuclear submarines (SSBNs) in the Jin class; each submarine would eventually 
deploy 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 7,400 kilometers, which 
could target Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast. The Chinese navy has constructed 
a major naval base at Yalong on Hainan Island that can accommodate nuclear-
powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines, and aircraft carriers (U.S. 
Secretary of Defense 2012). From Hainan Island, access to the open sea is through 
the South China Sea making it an important corridor for the Chinese navy. 
Moreover, the Chinese economy has become vulnerable to external 
disruption of oil and energy supplies, and this obliges its leaders to protect its 
extended trade routes and energy supply lines. Over 50% of China’s crude oil 
imports come from countries in the Middle East, and an estimated 80% of its 
total oil imports is shipped through the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits. 
These routes are vulnerable to interdiction by India and the United States. In time 
of conflict, both may hold China to ransom by interrupting China’s oil supplies. 
To protect its sea lanes and energy supplies, China has decided to develop a blue 
ocean naval capability, including aircraft carriers and accompanying escorts 
which could patrol as far as the Indian Ocean (Zhang 2006). This naval capability 
is best deployed in a way that allows access to the southwest, thus making Hainan 
Island the most suitable base. For these reasons, China requires control over the 
South China Sea, or at least the capability to prevent potentially hostile naval 
forces from threatening access by its navy to the open sea (Yoshihara and Holmes 
2010, 141-42; Buszynski 2012). 
If the dispute was only about maritime borders or access to oil and gas 
deposits, it could be settled by a mutual adjustment of claims, in much the same 
way that China and Vietnam negotiated a settlement over their border in the 
Gulf of Tonkin in 2000. However, the strategic factor has become more important 
to China as its naval capability has expanded to take on new missions that go 
beyond the traditional role of coastal defense. This factor engages the interests 
and lobbying efforts of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and tends to 
make China’s attitude towards the issue less flexible. The dispute may have been 
resolvable in earlier years, but since the strategic factor has emerged in China’s 
calculation of interests that prospect has become remote. 
Legality
The problem for China is that the existing legal framework does not support its 
claim to the South China Sea. According to international law, sovereignty over 
territory is demonstrated by continuous, peaceful and effective occupation, or by 
displays of sovereignty such as acts of state administration (Van Dyke 2009, 39-
75). This principle was laid down in the Island of Palmas Case by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration on April 4, 1928, and has been affirmed in various ways 
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since then. In the El Salvador/Honduras case of 1992 the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) examined the evidence of possession, control, and the display 
and exercise of sovereignty, coupled in each case with the position of the other 
party, to decide which islands belonged to Honduras and which to El Salvador 
(ICJ 1992). In the Malaysia/Indonesia dispute over Ligitan and Sipadan, the ICJ 
in 2002 noted Malaysia’s efforts to regulate and control the collection of turtle 
eggs, and its maintenance of lighthouses constructed in the colonial era on 
both islands. It decided that these were acts of administration that revealed an 
“intention to exercise state functions in respect of the two islands” (ICJ 2002).
China’s claim to the South China Sea is based on its U-shaped line that 
was published in April 1935 by the Republic of China’s Land and Water Maps 
Inspection Committee. When promulgated in 1947, the map had 11 dashes, but 
two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin area were removed by the People’s Republic 
of China in 1953, probably in order to accommodate Vietnam over Bai Long 
Wai Island, leaving nine dashes today (see Figure 1). China has given no official 
explanation of the nine-dash line—whether it is a claim to islands or sea territory 
within the lines, or whether it represents the exact boundaries of China’s claim. 
One Chinese interpretation is that it is a claim for islands and represents China’s 
“traditional maritime boundary” in the South China Sea (Li and Li 2003). The 
U-shaped line, however, does not conform to legal requirements and cannot 
be regarded as a legitimate maritime boundary. Another Chinese view suggests 
that it is “not a boundary line of territorial waters and is non-exclusive,” and that 
it does not prevent freedom of flight or navigation and does not conflict with 
EEZs or continental shelves (Tang 2013). In May 2009, China attached a map 
that included the U-shaped line with its nine dashes to its diplomatic note to 
the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in protest against 
Vietnamese and Malaysian joint submission. This was the first time that the nine-
dash line was used in an official communication (Zou 2012; Zou 2005, 47-60). To 
have legal validity, maps should be incorporated in a treaty, and should conform 
to certain definitional requirements in terms of clarification of boundaries and 
the content of the claim (Miyoshi 2012). The Chinese have recognized the legal 
weakness of the U-shaped line, and convened a team of scholars from both 
Taiwan and the mainland to strengthen its legal validity in 2012. The President of 
the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), Wu Shicun, has said 
that the intention is to give the international community a legal explanation of 
the U-shaped line within one year (Xinhuanet 2012b).
China cannot demonstrate that it has exercised administrative functions over 
the area or the islands within it. It occupies the Paracel Islands and nine islands 
in the Spratlys over which it may claim to exercise these functions, but not the 
entire area. China insists that it has rights of first discovery to the area. However, 
while Chinese historical sources mention the Paracels, the references to the 
Spratly Islands are contestable, as China had little contact with them historically. 
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China’s trade route to the West went through the Paracel Islands and along the 
Vietnamese coast, while the galleon trade with Spain went to the Philippines 
and then to Acapulco in Mexico. The Spratly area was bypassed in both cases 
(Ptak 2004, 120; Samuels 2005, 22). During the Qing dynasty China first raised 
Figure 1. China’s Nine-dash Line
Source: Courtesy of National Library of Australia.
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its claim to the South China Sea as a result of the war with France (1884-85), 
but in this case Chinese interest focused on the Paracels, not the Spratlys. There 
is evidence that China regarded the Paracels as its southern border, as reflected 
in Shin P’eng Fei’s 1928 Paracels Commission Report (Samuels 2005, 22). China 
only developed an interest in the Spratlys as a response to the French intrusion in 
1933, when France claimed the area, and later when the Japanese occupied some 
of the islands in 1939. The San Francisco Treaty of August 1951 divested Japan of 
all rights over the area, but China protested because the treaty did not affirm its 
sovereignty. Since then, China has insisted that the South China Sea had always 
been Chinese territory. 
Indeed, no claimant can demonstrate continuous and effective control and 
administration of the islands to satisfy the legal criteria. Vietnamese, Philippine, 
and Malaysian claims are of recent origin, and their validity is dependent upon a 
determination of the prior status of the area and the islands they have occupied. 
As the ICJ noted in the El Salvador/Honduras case, if the islands were not 
terra nullius beforehand then sovereignty over them could not be acquired by 
occupation. Vietnam occupies 21 islands in the Spratly area and has supplied 
maps and administrative records to demonstrate historical contact with the South 
China Sea, but they reveal contact only with the Paracels and not with the Spratly 
Islands (Valencia, Van Dyke, and Ludwig 1997). The Philippine claim is based on 
contiguity and the continental shelf, the occupation of eight islands which were 
considered terra nullius, and its Presidential Decree No. 1596 of June 11, 1978, 
which declared sovereignty over what was called the “Kalayaan Island Group” 
(Granados 2009; Yorac 1983). There are various difficulties with the Philippine 
claim aside from the issue of whether the islands were terra nullius. Unilateral 
declarations of sovereignty carry little legal weight on their own, and contiguity is 
no argument in international law. The continental shelf claim is weakened by the 
fact that there is no natural prolongation, as required by Article 76 of UNCLOS, 
since the deep Palawan Trough separates the Spratlys from the Philippine 
archipelago (Valencia, Van Dyke, and Ludwig 1997, 30). Malaysia occupies 
five islands and faces the same obstacle of determining their status before their 
occupation. It bases its claim on the continental shelf as depicted in a map 
published in 1979 that shows territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries. 
Brunei claims an EEZ that overlaps with the Malaysian claim, while Indonesia 
claims an EEZ around the Natuna Islands that overlaps with the Chinese claim (see 
Figure 2). 
China claims historical rights over the area based on first discovery. The 
difficulty is that international law does not support claims based on first discovery 
or contact against claims that can demonstrate effective and uninterrupted 
occupation. In the Island of Palmas case, Spain claimed title based on first 
discovery, but the court decided that “it is not sufficient to establish that a title was 
validly acquired at a specific moment, but it must be shown that sovereignty was 
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held continuously.” If Spain had title to the island, it was lost to the Netherlands 
because it failed to maintain continuous administrative functions over the 
island (Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928). This principle was upheld in the 
Eritrea-Yemen case when Yemen stressed the importance of “ancient title” to the 
islands in dispute. While the court did not dismiss the notion of ancient title, 
it referred to the Palmas precedent and used the test of the “continuous display 
of governmental authority and presence” to decide ownership of the islands 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration 1998). In a situation where its legal claim to the 
South China Sea is questionable, China has been stressing its historical rights 
Figure 2. CIA Map of South China Sea Claims
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Australia.
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based on first discovery and contact. China’s law on the EEZ and the Continental 
Shelf of June 26, 1998, stated that those historic rights would be unaffected by 
UNCLOS, which seemed to indicate an intention to revise international law, 
but it was unclear how this might be done (Zou 2012; Zou 2005, 157-74). A 
historic claim may have less authority than is required by UNCLOS, since it 
would depend upon what could be proven according to historical records. For 
this reason, the trend in China is to merge both historic and legal rights to 
support these claims. Accordingly, China can invoke UNCLOS to claim EEZs 
and continental shelves, and to make up for any shortfall it can call upon historic 
rights that would allow an extended claim up to the U-shaped line (Hong 2012). 
Still, UNCLOS does allow for “historic bays” under Article 10 according to strict 
criteria, but the concepts of historic rights or historic waters find little support in 
law.1
China, nonetheless, has continued to assert its historic rights over the South 
China Sea. The Chinese often declare that their historical notions of sovereignty 
predate Western international law and should be recognized as valid ab initio. 
Chinese commentaries argue that UNCLOS cannot be applied to the South 
China Sea since China had “indisputable sovereignty” over the area to begin with 
(Deng 2012). This broad rejection of international law where China’s historic 
claims to the area are concerned raises doubts about China’s commitment to 
UNCLOS. It also conflicts with the approach adopted by Chinese scholars who 
recognize both UNCLOS and historic rights as a basis for China’s claim. The 
view that international law should accommodate historical claims has some 
support in East Asia; some proponents argue that claims of sovereignty in Asia 
should not be judged by “norms developed in Europe” (Lee 2009). In a similar 
vein, these proponents argue that China had its own concept of maritime space 
and possession, which cannot be judged in terms of Western law. To establish 
possession, these scholars argue that it should be sufficient to identify what Ming 
and Qing China officials understood as their maritime boundaries (Suganuma 
2000). 
Particular difficulties arise in the modern era in attempting to prove historic 
claims; it would certainly be insufficient simply to assert them ignoring the legal 
procedures developed by modern international law. If competing claims are made 
based on historical title, and all are seemingly valid in their own terms, who will 
arbitrate between them and according to what criteria? Moreover, when claims 
based on ancient title lie dormant and are then revived, and they are challenged 
by claims based on principles developed by modern international law, how would 
a legal body decide between them? Modern international law offers objective 
criteria to decide between conflicting claims, without which the result would be 
confusion. Ancient records and a subjective understanding of possession alone 
are insufficient to decide sovereignty, without evidence that such possession was 
recognized by others. Indeed, inter-temporal law refers to Justice Max Huber’s 
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tests in the Palmas case to the effect that historical title should be assessed 
according to the criteria of the past, and any rights so obtained may be lost “if not 
maintained in accordance with the changes brought about by the development of 
modern international law” (Elias 1980). Without this requirement the law would 
fail to clarify complicated situations, and the result would be a slide towards using 
state power to force recognition of a claim. That slide has been noticeable in the 
South China Sea over the past few years.
Power
China’s shift to use of power should be explained in a wider context. Since 2009, 
China’s behavior over the South China Sea, and towards Japan over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, and also in relation to North Korea, has indicated a pattern of 
greater assertiveness and insistence upon national interests. One interpretation 
is opportunism: China has taken advantage of the global financial crisis that 
weakened the United States to advance Chinese interests in these areas. Chinese 
resentment of the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific, and the U.S. 
alliances with Japan and South Korea, were factors prompting Beijing to assume 
a tougher position. In relation to the South China Sea, the assertiveness may be 
related to increasing capabilities to promote China’s long-standing claim, which is 
indicative of a greater role for the military in Chinese foreign affairs (Swaine and 
Taylor 2000). The senior party leaders may control foreign and defense policy 
issues, but they do not have clear control or oversight over military actions at the 
operational level that can shape or undermine policy. Naval operations beyond 
China’s territorial borders, deployment of Chinese naval vessels into the territorial 
waters of other countries, interception of U.S. surveillance vessels operating near 
China, and military exercises conducted in the South China Sea and elsewhere, 
are all the business of the military, and they are undertaken with considerable 
autonomy (Swaine and Taylor 2000). This is not to say that the military exerts 
decisive influence over policy (which is clearly not the case), but that the 
professional autonomy of the military allows it to frame its own operating goals 
within the policy parameters set by the party leadership. The absence of effective 
coordination between the civilian and military sectors in the Chinese decision-
making system ensures that military activities assume a life of their own from 
which foreign ministry officials and Chinese scholars are excluded. What this 
means for the South China Sea case is that the strategic factor and the importance 
of naval deployments, supported by popular nationalism invoked by party 
officials and the mass media, increasingly shape Chinese attitudes towards the 
issue. The result is that the issue, which in the 1990s was regarded as negotiable, 
has become decidedly non-negotiable for the Chinese.
Chinese officials have said that because China had not insisted on its rights 
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in the past a false impression had been created that it was not defending its 
maritime interests, and this impression had to be corrected by assertiveness (Kenji 
2010). This assertiveness has been seen in the harassment tactics employed by the 
Chinese to intimidate the ASEAN claimants into accepting its claims. Encouraged 
by senior party leaders, local provincial authorities and agencies within China 
have scrambled to obtain their share of the South China Sea resources with the 
conviction that they belong to China, and to prevent the ASEAN claimants from 
exploiting the area. Some ASEAN diplomats suggest that prolonged Chinese 
harassment in the South China Sea is intended as a demonstration to the ASEAN 
claimants that they are not capable of supporting their own claims to the South 
China Sea. In such a scenario they would be obliged to settle with China and 
accept its dominant position in the area. The best interpretation of China’s actions 
is that it seeks to hustle the ASEAN claimants into a legal settlement based on 
renunciation or adjustment of their existing claims in recognition of China’s 
historical claims. China may then allow the ASEAN claimants some access to 
the resources to ensure their compliance with the arrangement. The worst-case 
interpretation, as suggested by Vietnamese officials, is that China would seek 
exclusive control over the area and the removal of the ASEAN claimants through 
a prolonged campaign of increasing harassment. In this case, China would 
attempt to impose a settlement by power.2 
Chinese maritime surveillance vessels have been discouraging major oil 
companies, whose oil exploration vessels have been contracted by ASEAN 
claimants, from operating in the area, obliging them to seek permission 
from China (Guinto and Ten Kate 2012). Vietnam has complained of regular 
incidents when Chinese maritime surveillance vessels severed the exploration 
cables of Vietnamese survey ships; such incidents were reported on May 26 and 
June 9, 2011, and November 30, 2012. China has also imposed an annual fishing 
ban around the Paracels from May 16 to August 1. Vietnam has vociferously 
protested, claiming that its fishermen are regularly arrested by Chinese patrol 
vessels, their vessels confiscated, and an exorbitant fine demanded for their 
release (South China Morning Post 2010). To enforce the ban and to protect its 
own fishing vessels China has dispatched converted naval craft, called “fishery 
patrol” vessels, to the South China Sea; this preserves the appearance of routine 
administrative action rather than naval activity which could raise the stakes. 
These vessels include the 4,500-ton Yuzheng 311, Yuzheng 202 (later sent to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu and replaced by the Yuzheng 301), and Yuzheng 302, as well as 
the modern Haixun 21 and Haixun 31. 
In 2011, the Philippines reported seven incidents involving Chinese 
harassment. On March 2, two Chinese patrol boats harassed an oil exploration 
ship in the Philippine claim zone 250 kilometers west of the Island of Palawan, 
and only left the area after the Philippine air force was scrambled. On April 
5, the Philippines lodged a formal protest at the UN, to which the Chinese 
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responded by accusing the Philippines of invading China’s waters (Cerojano 
2011). China deployed one of its most modern fishery patrol vessels, the 
Haixun 31, to the area while the Philippines dispatched its naval flagship, 
the World War II vintage Rajah Humabon (Burgonio 2011). In 2012, Forum 
Energy announced that the Sampaguita gas field in Reed Bank had more gas 
than initially expected, which prompted Manila to issue contracts for their 
exploitation. The gas reserves of Reed Bank were first discovered in 1976 
and have been contested by China ever since. At one time a Chinese vessel 
threatened to ram a survey vessel hired by a Philippine energy company, 
Philex Petroleum (Dela and Mogato 2012). A major standoff occurred with 
the Philippines on April 8, 2012 near Scarborough Shoal when two Chinese 
maritime surveillance vessels prevented a Philippine coast guard vessel from 
arresting Chinese fishermen poaching in the Philippine claim zone. Anti-
China demonstrations were held in Manila while the Chinese cancelled 
group tours to the Philippines and purchase orders for Philippine bananas. 
China’s Ambassador to ASEAN, Tong Xiaoling, insisted that the reef had been 
Chinese since “ancient times,” and waters around the island were traditional 
fishing grounds for Chinese fishermen (Xu 2012). Counter demonstrations 
were held in China and the nationalist Chinese newspaper, Global Times, 
declared that the Philippines had to be taught a lesson for its “aggressive 
nationalism,” and that China had to ensure victory “even if it means it may 
cost more than imagined” (Global Times 2012). The standoff eased after the 
Philippines withdrew its two coast guard vessels by June 15; and on June 25 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario reported that more than 
20 Chinese fishing boats had withdrawn from the area (Esplanada 2012). 
However, Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin noted that the Chinese 
had roped off entry into the lagoon at Scarborough Shoal to prevent Philippine 
fishermen from entering (Tubeza and Burgonio 2012). China’s actions prompted 
the Philippines to appeal to arbitration, and on January 22, 2013, it notified China 
that it was bringing the dispute before an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of 
UNCLOS (Brage 2013; Washington Times 2013; Philippine Embassy - Canberra). 
Predictably, the Chinese rejected the appeal.
China has gone further to assert its claim over the South China Sea by 
announcing plans to increase its maritime surveillance forces to 16 aircraft 
and 350 vessels by 2015. Vessels such as the 3,000-ton Haixun 11 and Haixun 
31 will support the smaller Haijian 84 and Haijian 72 maritime surveillance 
vessels, boosting China’s presence and capability in the area. In 2012, China’s 
State Oceanic Administration reported that 58 patrol missions were conducted in 
the South China Sea, and these missions are expected to increase. Their purpose 
will be to monitor shipping to carry out surveying duties, to “protect maritime 
security,” and to inspect foreign vessels operating in “Chinese waters” (Wang 
2011). In February 2013, three Chinese naval vessels entered the South China 
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Sea from the North China Sea Fleet to carry out patrol missions and training 
exercises in China’s “territorial waters” (Xinhua 2013). Clearly the Chinese 
authorities are aiming to create the conviction among the Chinese public that 
the South China Sea has always been Chinese, as much as Taiwan or any other 
territory of China, and it is now described as China’s “territorial waters.” What 
was once an outlying sea area for China has been elevated to the status of 
“Chinese territory,” becoming a focal point for a volatile Chinese nationalism 
for which historical distinctions and the rights of other claimants are irrelevant 
(Mcdonald 2012). Beginning in April 2012, the U-shaped line appeared on new 
Chinese passports as part of a map of China to buttress this conviction amongst 
the Chinese public. In response, Vietnam and the Philippines have begun to issue 
separate visas to Chinese visitors to avoid appearing to acquiesce to the Chinese 
claim. In July 2012, China also created a showpiece assembly of 45 deputies to 
administer the Paracels and Spratly Islands in the new city of Sansha in Hainan 
province (Xinhuanet 2012a). Hainan province announced new rules governing 
the area and stated that, beginning January 1, 2013, Chinese maritime police 
would board and search vessels conducting “illegal” activities in “Chinese waters” 
(Blanchard and Mogato 2012). The announcement stimulated much concern 
amongst the ASEAN claimants, especially since the Director General of the 
Foreign Affairs Office of Hainan Province, Wu Shicun, said that the rules covered 
all the land features inside the nine-dash line and adjacent waters. He further 
said that Chinese ships would be allowed to search and repel foreign ships if they 
were engaged in “illegal” activities within the 12-nautical-mile zone surrounding 
islands that China claims (Perlez 2012). The intention was to act against what 
the Chinese called “illegal” Vietnamese fishing in the Paracels area. The concern, 
however, was that if China were to enforce these rules, freedom of navigation in 
the wider South China Sea, which is of direct concern to external powers such as 
the United States and Japan, would be restricted. The rules were announced by a 
provincial authority and may be overridden by Beijing if they result in difficulties; 
but it is just as likely that the rules will be upheld by central authorities if they 
effectively demonstrate what is off limits for the ASEAN claimants. In time, 
then, the Chinese claims may be accepted by others simply to avoid trouble with 
Beijing. In January 2013, China published national maps that included the South 
China Sea and Taiwan together with the mainland, making them appear an 
integral part of China’s national territory. Without access to objective information 
about the situation, the Chinese public would imagine that the South China Sea 
was always part of China, just like any other province.
Chinese scholars and foreign ministry officials often stress that China is 
prepared to negotiate the issue and that Beijing has always stood for “negotiation 
of international disputes through peaceful means” (Wang 2013). Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Fu Ying claimed that China has consistently attempted to 
resolve the dispute through friendly negotiations between sovereign countries and 
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that the Philippines was to blame for the increase in tensions (China Daily 2012). 
Foreign ministry officials are simply repeating old statements out of habit when in 
fact the time for negotiation has passed for China. The invocation of nationalism, 
and the publication of maps which treat the South China Sea as an integral part 
of China, show that the intention is not to negotiate, but to affirm China’s claims 
and to put ASEAN claimants on notice accordingly. China’s new leader Xi Jinping 
has revealed a tough position in relation to these maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In a speech in December 2012, 
China’s new leader stressed firmness in “safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security 
and territorial integrity,” though he also mentioned that China would resolve 
differences with neighbors peacefully “through friendly negotiations” (Li 2012). It 
is difficult to see how China could insist on its claim in no uncertain terms and at 
the same time offer to negotiate with the ASEAN claimants—unless the intention 
is to obtain their endorsement of the Chinese position. Xi has also stressed his 
ties with the Chinese military, which serves as the ultimate guarantor of the party 
leadership as it faces fissiparous tendencies in a rapidly changing society that 
could challenge its authority. Xi succeeded Hu Jintao as party chief and chair of 
the Central Military Commission in November 2012, and has already made nine 
visits to army units and commanders. He also made a brief visit to a destroyer in 
the South China Sea, and met commanders of China’s strategic nuclear missiles 
(Buckley 2013). As China’s new leader strengthens his links with the military to 
ensure regime survival, it is very unlikely that he would curb its activities or its 
deployment of naval vessels in disputed areas, or challenge its understanding of 
the strategic value of the South China Sea. 
China’s harassment tactics in the South China Sea have drawn in the United 
States and other external powers increasing the risks and the uncertainty. The 
United States is troubled by China’s assertiveness, and its broader interests 
cause several concerns. One concern is that a dominant China would exclude 
American energy companies from exploration and drilling in the area. A second 
is that control over the South China Sea could trigger the fragmentation of 
ASEAN, whose unity has supported a favorable regional order conducive for 
the American presence. ASEAN was divided over the issue in April 2012 when 
Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair, opposed the Philippine demand to place the South 
China Sea on the agenda of the 20th ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh. Cambodia 
has been accused of acting as a proxy for China, which has invested some two 
billion US dollars in the country, building infrastructure, roads, and dams for 
which its leader, Hun Sen, is keen to show his gratitude. In July 2012, the 45th 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting failed to issue a communiqué because it could 
not come to agreement over the issue. The issue found a place in the chairman’s 
statement of the 21st ASEAN summit in November 2012, but the damage had 
been done, and ASEAN disunity over the issue had been revealed. A third 
concern is that a dominant Chinese position in the area would allow China to 
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threaten the sea lanes of the Western Pacific, and the oil lifelines of Japan and 
South Korea. China’s ability to threaten the sea lanes would be enhanced if 
Taiwan rejoined the mainland, in which case pressure on Japan and Korea to 
accommodate China in various ways would be increased. Japan in particular 
would be alarmed, and though the Japanese may re-route their sea shipments of 
oil and material though the Indonesian straits, costs would rise significantly. A 
fourth concern is that China may gain strategic advantages by dominating the 
South China Sea, increasing the operational reach of its growing navy. China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea was an important factor behind the Obama 
Administration’s rebalancing policy, also called the pivot strategy, of rearranging 
military forces in the Asia region, which was announced in November 2011 (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2012). This would entail moving some 9,000 marines 
from Okinawa to places like Guam, Australia and the Philippines on rotation, and 
developing closer security relationships with Indonesia and Vietnam, which share 
similar concerns about China. Due to its proximity to the South China Sea, the 
Philippines has assumed a key role in the United States rebalancing strategy. In 
November 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Philippine Foreign Affairs 
Secretary Alberto del Rosario that “any nation with a claim has a right to exert 
it, but they do not have a right to pursue it through intimidation or coercion” 
(Whaley 2012b). The Philippines will offer the United States greater access to 
its airfields and will receive surveillance data in return. U.S. naval vessels are 
expected to receive maintenance, repair and logistics support at Subic Bay, which 
the Americans vacated in 1992. The United States also decided to triple Foreign 
Military Financing for the Philippines in 2012, from 11.9 million US dollars to 
30 million dollars to help it build a “credible minimum defense posture” (Mogato 
2012). The United States has transferred two 3,250-ton Hamilton-class naval 
cutters to the Philippines for coast guard duties, and a third will follow along with 
a squadron of secondhand F-16s (Whaley 2012a). 
Japan is also becoming involved. Under pressure from the Chinese in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, where China is adopting similar harassment 
tactics, Japan has moved to strengthen security cooperation with both Vietnam 
and the Philippines. In a diplomatic effort to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia, 
Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Indonesia, on his first overseas trip abroad after his election in January 2013. In 
the same month Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida visited the Philippines, 
Singapore, Brunei, and Australia. As the Asahi Shimbun (2013) noted: “It is vital 
for countries facing challenges posed by China’s growing economic and military 
power to bolster their cooperation.” Japan announced that it will donate patrol 
boats to the Philippines; Filipinos expect to receive 12 vessels, at least two of 
which will be 1,300-ton Hateruma-class patrol vessels. The Japanese coastguard 
intends to train Philippine and Vietnamese personnel to boost security 
cooperation. 
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Similarly, India has become involved to protect its oil companies that have 
contracted with the Vietnamese for exploration and survey work in the area. 
India also can use the South China Sea as a pressure point against China over 
other longstanding issues that concern it, such as the festering border dispute in 
the Himalayan region, and China’s as yet limited presence in the Indian Ocean. 
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, in April 2012, declared: “India maintains 
that (the) South China Sea is the property of the world. […] those trade ways 
must be free from any national interference” (Economic Times 2012). Indian navy 
chief Admiral D.K. Joshi, has stated that the navy may be deployed to the South 
China Sea where the Indian oil company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, has a 
stake in a gas and oil exploration block in the Nam Con Son basin off the coast of 
Vietnam (Business and Finance News 2012). 
China cannot force the issue of the South China Sea with Vietnam and the 
Philippines without further increasing tensions and involving external powers 
more deeply in the disputes. Neither the United States nor Japan would become 
immediate actors in any dispute, and a direct U.S.-China clash in the area is not 
on the cards. However, their anxiety over threats to freedom of navigation would 
prompt their involvement as supporters of the ASEAN claimants and as suppliers 
of arms and weapons to the Philippines. Since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
took up the issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010, the United States 
has provided the ASEAN claimants with moral support, encouraging them to 
resist China. The Chinese may calculate that the United States has too much at 
stake in maintaining good relations with them to confront it over this issue, but 
that would be a risky assumption. The uncertainty of the American response 
could act as a deterrent to overt Chinese action, as could the possibility of greater 
security cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the ASEAN claimants. 
While China may avoid direct action in the area, the main risk of the South China 
Sea dispute is not conflict with the United States, but error or miscalculation on 
the part of local Chinese commanders that may draw in the United States. These 
local commanders may act on the basis of an assertive nationalism that they have 
been encouraged to believe in and support. The risk of miscalculation poses real 
dangers, particularly as China has not developed an effective crisis management 
system that would overcome the compartmentalization of the civilian and 
military sectors. China’s slow response to crisis situations was revealed during the 
accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, and 
the EP-3 surveillance aircraft incident of April 2001. In the latter case a Chinese 
J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3E Aries signals intelligence aircraft that was 
engaged in surveillance off the coast of Hainan and the U.S. plane was forced to 
land on the island. What was disturbing about the incident was the delay in the 
Chinese response, which led to speculation that President Jiang Zemin was being 
fed a distorted version of events that justified a tough Chinese reaction. Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage disclosed that American efforts to resolve 
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the incident quickly through behind-the-scenes phone calls at a high level were 
unsuccessful as the Chinese would not answer the phone. It was only 11 days 
later, after Colin Powell expressed “regret” over the incident to meet the Chinese 
demand for an apology, that the crew of the aircraft were released (Kan et al. 
2001). The crisis passed, but it left an indelible impression of a Chinese decision-
making system that could not respond effectively to crises. 
Stabilization and Conflict Prevention
The immediate priority is to stabilize the situation in the South China Sea and 
prevent accidental conflict in disputed areas, particularly as China increases 
deployment of patrol craft there. ASEAN concluded a Declaration on a Code 
of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea with China on September 2, 2002, 
which was a statement of broad principles of behavior. ASEAN’s intention was 
to move to a legally binding COC and not just a statement of principles, which 
China has resisted. Chinese officials have argued that since the South China Sea 
is Chinese territory anyway, a COC is not relevant. While China holds to this 
belief, the prospects for the COC are not bright. Another approach is to negotiate 
Incidents at Sea Agreements (INCSEA) to avoid naval clashes in these areas and 
to prevent accidental escalation if clashes occur. These agreements would detail 
procedures to avoid collisions between patrol vessels by ensuring safe distance 
from each other, and would require commanders to use caution in approaching 
other vessels. They would also include procedures for communication between 
navies and governments in the event of a clash, and the establishment of 
hotlines between the naval commands or coast guards in the area. The most 
notable example is the INCSEA between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, concluded on May 25, 1972, after a series of incidents at sea involving 
harassment, simulated attacks and dangerous maneuvers (Bureau of International 
Security and Nonproliferation 1972). On January 19, 1998, the United States 
and China concluded an agreement to ensure maritime safety, which called for 
consultations, and measures to improve maritime practices and communications 
procedures when vessels encounter each other (Federation of American Scientists 
1998). Though a step in the right direction something more concrete is required 
under the present circumstances. China may be reluctant to consider an INCSEA 
that would limit its freedom of action, but its perspective might change if it were 
to face the consequences of an accidental clash or a crisis. 
Can the dispute be resolved? Vietnamese officials who were asked this 
question were adamant that no resolution was possible at this time since China’s 
intention to control the entire South China Sea was consistent and unwavering. 
Nonetheless, they do acknowledge that there are limits to China’s activities, as 
China is dependent upon the prevailing international economic order and would 
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not go so far as to cause serious disruption. This gives some hope for a resolution 
of the dispute.3 Various well-meaning proposals have been aired to bring about 
a resolution, but most have been outdated and rendered meaningless by recent 
events. The obvious approach is to seek a legal resolution of the dispute which 
entails the application of UNCLOS principles according to an agreed equitable 
formula that would take into account the claims of the littoral states. According 
to Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS-III, in the case of overlapping EEZs and 
continental shelves, delimitation will be effected by agreement on the basis of 
international law or by appeal to the International Court of Justice to “reach 
an equitable solution.” Both articles mention that if no agreement is reached 
within a “reasonable period of time” then the parties “shall resort” to the dispute 
resolution procedures in Part XV. Based on UNCLOS, a logical approach would 
be to apportion maritime territory according to contiguous EEZs and continental 
shelves, where they have been declared, and to use coastline lengths to determine 
the maritime zones that occupied islands would be entitled to. Aside from the 
practical difficulties of arranging the apportionment, the major problem is that 
neither China nor Vietnam has defined its claims. China’s U-shaped line has not 
been officially explained; whether it is a claim to islands or an exclusive claim to 
sea territory is unclear, and its exact boundaries are still undefined. Vietnam has 
issued declarations of sovereignty over islands without specifying exactly what 
is included in this claim or what the coordinates are. Moreover, these proposals 
would significantly reduce the maritime area available to China, which would be 
stripped of its claim to the entire area with little compensation, particularly as the 
oil and gas fields are outside the central area in areas that fall in the EEZs of the 
ASEAN claimants. 
Within ASEAN, joint development was regarded as a way of overcoming 
the sovereignty imbroglio: If claimants could be induced to cooperate over 
oil and gas extraction perhaps they would learn to overcome their differences 
over sovereignty through a cooperative solution. The idea was first broached 
by Chinese Premier Li Peng in Singapore on August 13, 1990, when he called 
upon claimants to set aside sovereignty to enable joint development to proceed. 
The Chinese Premier wanted to improve relations with ASEAN after alarms 
were raised by the clash with Vietnam in the South China Sea in March 1988 
and by the Tiananmen Square events of June 1989. Joint development has 
been repeatedly raised by Chinese Foreign Ministry officials but without 
further clarification. One agreement came close when the Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking Accord was concluded in March 2005 between China National 
Offshore Oil Company, the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation, and the Philippine 
National Oil Company (People’s Daily 2005). It was simply a three year agreement 
for joint seismic exploration, but it was strongly criticized by the Philippine 
side because the area of activity was mainly in the Philippine claim zone. Since 
then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ling perfunctorily mentioned joint 
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development in an interview in September 2012, but the time for it has long since 
passed (Ling 2012). 
Third party mediation has also been raised as a possibility, since Article 
287 of UNCLOS enjoins parties to a maritime dispute to resort to four dispute 
resolution mechanisms: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 
Hamburg; the International Court of Justice in The Hague; ad hoc arbitration 
in accordance with Annex VII; or a “special arbitral tribunal” constituted for 
certain categories of disputes. Compulsory mediation with binding authority is 
voluntary, and UNCLOS has no immediate way of dealing with a situation where 
the claimants have no intention of resorting to binding mediation. The only 
attempt to invoke third party mediation over the dispute occurred on January 
22, 2013, when Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario announced that 
the Philippines would take the issue to an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII 
of UNCLOS (Department of Foreign Affairs 2013). The move has the support 
of the United States but the Chinese predictably opposed it, without Chinese 
representation it would be unlikely that the case would be heard. International 
lawyers suggest that the tribunal could appoint a representative for China, but 
this would simply create new difficulties, as China may disown the proceedings.
The idea of a cooperative maritime regime has often been raised; this 
would entail a mutual adjustment of claims and a sharing of resources under an 
authority or body created for this purpose. A maritime regime is a cooperative 
effort to regulate behavior in a given area according to agreed rules and norms, 
which give effect to the notion of a common good. Article 123 of UNCLOS 
stipulates that states “bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-
operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance 
of their duties under this Convention,” and the article adds that they should do 
so “directly or through an appropriate regional organization.” An appropriate 
regional organization could be a Spratly Resource Development Authority, or a 
Spratly Management Authority, which would grant permits for exploration and 
joint development; it could have a secretary general, a secretariat, and a council. 
The Authority would direct the financial resources of claimants into a common 
fund to promote joint efforts to develop the area’s oil and gas fields (Valencia, 
Van Dyke, and Ludwig 1997). The idea of a cooperative regime has appeal, but its 
implementation requires agreement between the claimants and prior resolution 
of their claims; it is a product of a resolution of the issue, not a means to bring 
about a resolution. It may act as an incentive to the claimants to resolve their 
claims, but its acceptance would require a political decision, a step that would be 
particularly difficult for China.
Proposals for a cooperative maritime regime would carry greater weight if 
they were endorsed by a UN-sponsored conference on the South China Sea that 
involved China and the ASEAN claimants in the first instance, as well as external 
stakeholders. Such a conference would reveal the legal weaknesses of the claims, 
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including the U-shaped line, and would seek their cooperative adjustment. The 
agenda would also include the formation of a regional body, or cooperative 
regime, that would adopt rules regarding fishing practices and quotas, oil and 
gas exploration, and the passage of naval vessels in the maintenance of freedom 
of navigation. Held under UN auspices, the conference would ensure conformity 
to international law and would restrain any temptation to depart from it to 
accommodate superior power. Philippine President Fidel Ramos in 1992, 
proposed an international conference on the Spratlys under UN auspices; the 
proposal was mentioned again by Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus 
at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting, in July 1992. However, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry quickly voiced its opposition, and the proposal has not been 
raised since. China has consistently rejected multilateral negotiations of the 
issue in the past and may continue to insist that the South China Sea is Chinese 
territory. However, the incentive for China to join this process of resolution is 
the legalization of its position and stabilization of the area while reducing the 
prospect of raising tensions or increasing the risk of instability. China will not 
gain legal acceptance of its claim by power alone, but through a conference of this 
kind would gain shared access to the resources in the area. China would repair 
its relationship with ASEAN and would earn the gratitude of the organization, 
which would be more likely to come to terms with China over this and other 
issues as well. It would ease the regional polarization created by China’s attempt 
to gain unilateral benefits in the sea by resorting to power. China would also 
avoid pushing the ASEAN claimants to seek support from the United States and 
Japan, and would give external powers no cause to cooperate against China. A 
resolution of this kind would also remove the main motive for America’s pivot 
strategy, stimulating cooperation rather than rivalry with the United States. 
Indeed, in such a scenario China’s regional position would be enhanced and its 
international credibility elevated. 
Conclusion
China’s policy toward the South China Sea is reflected not only in the public 
statements of Foreign Ministry officials and senior party leaders who call 
for peace, joint development, and friendly negotiations. Despite these public 
statements what China wants to do is not so easily identified. China’s intentions 
are closely linked to the opportunities created by its activities in the area, 
as undertaken by the Chinese navy, provincial authorities, and maritime 
surveillance agencies. These activities which include harassment tactics and low-
level confrontation, shape China’s position for as long as they are not disowned 
by the party leadership. Indeed, these activities are the instruments of Chinese 
policy, and China’s objectives would expand according to their success, or they 
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could be curtailed if significant dangers were revealed. As China continues 
with these tactics and naval deployments in the area, greater instability and 
uncertainty may be expected. In other cases, when governments have been locked 
into seemingly unyielding positions, they have been compelled to change when 
faced with the prospect of conflict or crisis escalation. Crises can have a shock 
effect upon political leaders who become aware of the dangers of continuing with 
familiar behavior, thus demanding of them major changes of policy and attitude. 
At the present moment it seems that only a crisis will trigger the necessary change 
of attitudes over the South China Sea, particularly within China. At that point the 
proposal for a UN-sponsored conference on the South China Sea would become 
more meaningful.
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